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‘There are more of you than there are of us’: Forced Entertainment and the 





There are striking similarities between some of the work produced by Sheffield based 
performance ensemble Forced Entertainment and the revolutionary theories of Slavoj Žižek. 
On the surface this comparison may seem unlikely and unsupported by the two jokes below, 
which appear, at first glance, to be aiming for entirely different effects. The first, revolving 
around the anti-Semitic stereotype of the greedy Jew, is expansive and incident driven in the 
tradition of the shaggy dog story, with Žižek drawing the listener in to the circular incidents 
which lead exactly nowhere.  
 
At the beginning of this century, a Pole and a Jew were sitting in a train, 
facing each other. The Pole was shifting nervously, watching the Jew all the 
time, something was irritating him; finally, unable to restrain himself any 
longer, he exploded: ‘Tell me, how do you Jews succeed in extracting from 
people the last small coin and in this way accumulate all your wealth?’ The 
Jew replied: ‘Ok, I will tell you, but not for nothing; first, you give me five 
zloty [Polish money].’ After receiving the required amount, the Jew began: 
‘First, you take a dead fish; you cut off her head and put her entrails in a 
glass of water. Then around midnight, when the moon is full, you must bury 
this glass in a churchyard….’ ‘And’, the Pole interrupted him greedily, ‘if I 
do all this, will I also become rich?’ ‘Not too quickly,’ replied the Jew; 
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‘This is not all you must do; but if you want to hear the rest, you must pay 
me another five zloty!’ After receiving the money again, the Jew continued 
his story; soon afterwards, he again demanded more money, and so on, until 
finally the Pole exploded in fury: ‘You dirty rascal, do you really think I did 
not notice what you were aiming at? There is no secret at all, you simply 
want to extract the last small coin from me!’ The Jew answered him calmly 
and with resignation: ‘Well, now you see how we, the Jews….’1 
 
The second joke, taken from Forced Entertainment’s production First Night, is a patter 
delivered directly to the audience which, in its exposure of the audience’s expectations and 
the performers’ staged inability to live up to these, immediately suggests a tradition of front 
cloth comedy pursued by such British variety performers as Morecambe and Wise: 
 
Robin Arthur (to audience): There are more of you than there are of us. So if 
it comes to a fight you’ll win.2 
 
The significant relation between the two jokes is that in each the listener/spectator is 
positioned as ultimately constitutive of the joke itself. Without the Pole’s initial suspicion, the 
Jew would not be able to trick him out of his money. Without the spectators’ suspected 
animosity there would be no prospect of a future fight. In each case, the listener/spectator’s 
real or supposed desire motivates resistance to and collaboration with the speaker, who is 
thus centrally implicated in the ensuing exchange. For Žižek, such inclusive dynamics raise 
crucial questions about the ways in which ideological operations are interwoven into 
everyday reality and, also, how they are socially and culturally sustained. Forced 
Entertainment probe such operations as they play out in the performer-spectator relationship, 
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creating, in Etchells’ words, ‘a place in which the audience can wonder about what they’re 
watching, about why they’re watching, about what they want from watching; wonder about 
their own role in terms of the piece that they’re looking at’.3 
 
Forced Entertainment is centred on a collective of six performers who have produced work 
together, in a wide variety of forms, for approximately thirty years. Below I consider three 
performances: Void Story (2009) Speak Bitterness (1995) and Exquisite Pain (2005), which I 
argue have a specific resonance with Žižek’s theories. I discuss how Void Story and Speak 
Bitterness resonate with Žižek’s particular understanding of ideology critique. For Žižek, the 
efficacy of ideology critique lies not in the urge to raise consciousness and expose the 
relations of production, as might be identified in Brecht’s (somewhat more traditional) 
understanding of the term. Ideology, in Žižek’s words, is not ‘a dreamlike illusion that we 
make use of in order to escape our insupportable reality, in its basic dimension it is rather a 
fantasy construction which serves as a support for reality itself’.4 The figure of the Jew cited 
in the joke above, whose supposed greed is a displacement and consequence of the Pole’s 
own greed, is an example of such a fantasy construction. The joke typifies the ‘radically 
intersubjective character of fantasy’ in which both the Jew and the Pole are subjects ensnared 
in an ‘opaque network whose meaning and logic elude [their] control’.5 Ideology critique is 
no longer a matter of exposing the truth which the dominant order has hidden behind a smoke 
screen. Rather it challenges our active complicity in the construction of the ideological 
fantasy. 
 
Just as in Žižek’s joke the Pole is shown to be constitutive of the meaning attributed to the 
Jew, I argue that the dramaturgical structures of Void Story and Speak Bitterness invite 
recognition of how, as spectators, our own desire and enjoyment are problematically 
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embroiled in a process of ‘meaning making’ which is in itself embedded in our neoliberal 
culture. In contrast, I argue that Exquisite Pain moves beyond Žižekian ideology critique and 
into an exploration of the fidelity to desire - a different and yet equally important aspect of 
(the relationship between) Žižek’s and Forced Entertainment’s work. I suggest that Exquisite 
Pain offers an exploration of the energies which Žižek argues are required for political and 
social change and - in this sense - it complements, rather than furthers, the ideology critique 
implicit to Void Story and Speak Bitterness. In order to further these arguments, it is 
necessary to map out certain key features of what I have termed the ‘neoliberal subject’. 
 
The Neoliberal Subject 
 
Žižek cites Walter Benn Michaels in his argument that American liberals 
 
carry on about racism and sexism in order to avoid doing so about capitalism. 
Either because they genuinely do think that inequality is fine as long as it is 
not a function of discrimination (in which case they are neoliberals of the 
right). Or because they think that fighting against racial and sexual inequality 
is at least a step in the direction of real equality (in which case, they are 
neoliberals of the left).6 
 
Here the distinctions between the political left and right are bound together around the nodal 
point of neoliberalism. Underlying distinctions between the two remain, but at the same time 
the two factions obviously appear to exist in agreement with rather than in antagonism to 
each other. Initially a term which designated a specific form of economic and political 
organisation, introduced into Britain by the right wing government of Margaret Thatcher in 
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1979, the term thus quilts a wide range of floating signifiers, thereby drawing into its orbit 
both the left and right wing of the political spectrum. 
 
David Harvey has argued that neoliberalism has been able to absorb the left because from the 
outset it incorporated ‘the ideals of human dignity and individual freedom’ into the 
acceptable common sense traditions of British thought.7 Before the premiership of Margaret 
Thatcher - in the protest movements of the 1960s, for example - Harvey argues that the fight 
for individual freedom was closely allied to matters of social justice. Subsequently, however, 
the ability to separate the two has become constitutive of the current neoliberal norm, 
diverting individual freedom away from socio-economic structures and into the realms of 
cultural concern. 
 
Neoliberal rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, 
has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, 
and eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in 
pursuit of social justice through the conquest of state power.8  
 
This raises questions concerning the connotations of the phrase ‘neoliberal subject’ as used in 
the title of this chapter. Žižek’s understanding of the subject is, of course, extrapolated from 
Lacan’s notion of the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. He summarises imaginary 
identification as ‘identification with the image in which we appear likeable to ourselves, with 
the image representing “what we would like to be’’’.9 He outlines symbolic identification as 
‘identification with the very place from where we are being observed, from where we look at 
ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love’.10 And he also argues that 
there is a continuous interplay between our imaginary and symbolic identifications. 
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Following both Žižek and Harvey, however, the point of identification which might be 
understood to yoke the symbolic to the imaginary in the neoliberal version of subjectivity is 
an ethical preoccupation with human relations purely on a cultural plane. This overlooks the 
traditional leftist concern with inequalities born of socio-economic factors, of the real of class 
relations and antagonisms. Thus that which is at stake for the neoliberal subject is a 
transcendent concern with personal freedom as a matter of cultural sensibility independent of 
the frameworks of what we might call ‘social justice’. The work of Forced Entertainment is 
not, I argue, preoccupied directly with ideology critique as a means of analysing and 
exposing the political forces that threaten social justice. Instead, the company’s aesthetic 
experimentation and investigation of the performer / spectator relationship arrest the 
sensibilities of the subject-spectator in ways which disallow the capacity to distance oneself 
from ideology, exposing individual freedom as a fantasy construct which supports neoliberal 
reality.  
 
The dramaturgical structures of Void Story and Speak Bitterness invoke the imaginary and 
symbolic dimensions of the neoliberal subject whose self-deluding fetishistic operations form 
an intrinsic component of the performance. Where this implicates the spectator in these 
unfolding performance events, the repetitive structure of Exquisite Pain, alternatively, erodes 




In a post-show talk after a performance of Void Story at the Lawrence Batley Theatre in 
Huddersfield, Robin Arthur recalled that, at a similar event, one audience member had said of 
the show that it was something Brecht might have done if he had had a laptop. The piece 
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involves Arthur and three other performers, Terry O’Connor, Cathy Naden and Richard 
Lowdon, who sit in pairs at each side of the stage reading out a story, whilst a series of 
accompanying black and white collaged images are projected onto a large screen centre stage, 
thereby creating the impression of a moving story board. The collaged imagery seems to 
capture a quality of abstractness which distances and defamiliarises their subject matter. It is 
in this context that we might understand Arthur’s reference to Brecht as, unlike conventional 
film imagery, the cut-up images produce a distancing effect.  
 
It is questionable, however, whether this can be compared to a Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt 
(V-effect). For Elizabeth Wright the purpose of ‘the V-effect is to reveal how the laws of 
society operate, demonstrating that nothing is normal and natural for all time, and thus 
intervening in the process’.11 Through the Brechtian V-effect, the spectator is invited to see 
how and where the protagonist might make alternative choices in order to effect social 
change. However, this is not a process which can be associated with Void Story. The two 
protagonists Kim and Jackson are faced with one crisis after another: they lose their home, 
they are attacked by giant insects, chased by unknown assailants, they find themselves in the 
middle of a war which they did not know was happening … and so it goes on, crisis after 
crisis, until their final obliteration by a drone. Though the collaged images defamiliarise the 
spectator, potentially inciting them to imagine their own choices within the scenarios 
presented, this invitation is prematurely stunted by the persistent narrativising intervention of 
the performers. This might best be illuminated, not through reference to Brecht, but to 
Etchells’ own writing on collage and Žižek’s notion of ‘the subject supposed to know’.12  
 
In an essay written for the catalogue of artist Elizabeth Magill’s 2005 exhibition at the Tate 
Liverpool, Tim Etchells discusses the properties of Magill’s collages and their possible 
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effects on the viewer. Particularly interesting in relation to the use of collage in Void Story 
are Etchells’ insights into the ways in which Magill’s employment of fragmentary imagery 
captures ‘heavily cropped and to some extent context-less views’.13 Etchells argues that: 
 
What becomes clear is that the significance of these incomplete places lies 
not so much in their content as in the very act - performed first by Magill and 
then by ourselves as viewers - of recovering images, however partial, from 
the ‘museum of memory’.14  
 
Just as Magill’s collaged images engage the viewer in a process of remembering and 
imagining, so in Void Story the collaged, ‘heavily cropped and to some extent context-less 
views’ also invite the spectator to fill out the story. The difference is that in Void Story this 
‘filling out’ is done for the spectator by the performers. They ‘fill out’ what is said by the cut-
up collages of figures, adding the noises and sound effects of the collaged landscapes and so 
determining the ‘personalities’ of both people and place. Thus the spectator is consistently 
caught between an invitation to imagine implicit in the aesthetic form itself and the 
performers’ full and incessant ‘doing it for them’. In this formal delegation of the spectator’s 
imaginative capacity to the performers, the performers are designated, in both Lacanian and 
Žižekian terms, as the ‘subjects supposed to know’.15  
 
For both Žižek and Lacan, the notion of ‘the subject who is supposed to know’ involves a 
transference of knowledge from the subject on to the Other. Coining the term interpassivity, 
as opposed to interactivity, Žižek argues that this experience in which ‘the Other does it for 
me’ is a way of registering one’s compliance with the big Other of the symbolic order.16 The 
Other is presumed to know the answer to the question of the subject’s desire, a question 
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which is unanswerable and which in itself constitutes the role of the Other as the subject 
supposed to know. This circular bind is reminiscent of Žižek’s joke about the Pole and the 
Jew at the opening of this chapter. In his analysis of the joke, Žižek draws attention to the 
glint in the eye of the Pole when he supposes the Jew to be the one who knows the answer to 
his question and therefore to be able to satisfy his desire. The Jew’s story functions as a 
fantasy object which fills out a lack, a void in the Other. As Žižek argues ‘there is nothing 
“behind” the fantasy; the fantasy is a construction whose function is to hide this void, this 
“nothing” - that is, the lack in the Other’.17 What is revealed to the Pole is that it is his own 
desire which has motivated the Jew’s story - the fantasy construction - and that this is 
ultimately the answer to his own question. In other words, he is the instigator and unwitting 
keeper of the secret he is so desperate to uncover elsewhere. In Void Story, the spectator is 
made explicitly aware of this imagining being ‘done for them’ and, correspondingly, that the 
performer is positioned as the ‘one who is supposed to know’. 
 
This point is driven home at the end of Void Story when for the first time the collaged story 
board images are construed to represent the spectator’s point of view, and we see Kim and 
Jackson through the camera lens of a surveillance drone which identifies them as targets for 
extermination.  
 
Kim: Can you picture the person who’s controlling this drone?  
Jackson: No.  
Kim: They must be a thousand miles away. [...]  
Jackson: It’s like some poor creature.  
Kim: It’s just a drone; it’s not a thinking thing at all.18 
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As the ultimate illustration of Žižek’s notion of interpassivity, drones are not actively piloted 
but delegated to act on behalf of a faceless other. Accordingly, the big Other of the Symbolic 
order, presumed to lie behind the absurdist universe terrifying the protagonists, here becomes 
identified with the spectator who can no longer disavow responsibility for the relentless 
sequence of crises.  
 
This conclusive positioning of the spectator as integral to Kim and Jackson’s demise finally 
makes explicit what has been indicated throughout the performance: the implicit complicity 
between the desire of the spectator and the performer as the one who is supposed to know. 
The imaginative ‘filling out’ of the fragmentary collages is not, despite appearances, done for 
us in the sense that the other takes on the responsibility of acting on our behalf. Rather, it is 
done for us in the sense that it is shaped and enacted in order to fulfil our desire. Kim and 
Jackson’s reflection on the drone disavows its apparent mechanical independence and relates 
it back to the unseen (ideological) programmer who has set it in motion; in doing so, they 
simultaneously implicate the spectator as the subject whose desire is the hidden cause of the 
theatrical catastrophes they have endured.   
 
The aesthetic and dramaturgical structures of Void Story offer both an experience of 
interpassive complicity and its simultaneous critique, inviting reconsideration of complicit 
ideological engagement through experiential, rather than cerebral means. Unlike conventional 
ideology critique, this is located and exposed as operating inside the same theatrical 
structures that approach it, implicit to the intersubjective encounter between the performer 
and spectator. The impact of Speak Bitterness is similarly experiential, though its 
dramaturgical structures serve less an exploration of complicity through desire and more a 
sustained probing of the spectator’s experience of enjoyment. 




Speak Bitterness has been performed both as a durational performance lasting several hours 
and within a more familiar time frame of approximately an hour and a half. Unlike Void 
Story, Speak Bitterness does not follow a narrative structure but takes the form of an endless 
catalogue of confessions presented as a direct address to the audience. These range (in no 
particular order) from the banal, such as ‘We got drunk and got tattoos’ to the obscene, for 
example, ‘We dropped atom bombs on Nagasaki, Coventry, Seattle, Belize, Belsize Park and 
Hiroshima’.19 Since its first performance, the text has been regularly updated with topical 
allusions including ‘We drove the planes right into the towers - it was beautiful, beautiful, 
beautiful and it changed the world’ and ‘We are guilty of leaving our children unattended in 
hotel rooms on holiday’, following the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center and 
the abduction of Madeleine McCann, respectively.20  
 
This endless stream of confessions is read by the ensemble from sheets of paper laid out on a 
table which separates the spectators from the performers – us from them. These confessions 
may be, or may have been, true for someone at some time. They seem unlikely to be true for 
the performers, not only because of the extraordinary nature of some of the confessions, such 
as those regarding the twin towers and Madeleine McCann quoted above, but because of the 
way in which the performers randomly select and read out the texts - a technique which 
suggests the lack of a predetermined fit between speaker and confession. Nevertheless, the 
performers seem to capture a range of emotional responses (for example, embarrassment, 
anger, shame) indicating their commitment to, and complicity with, the confessions which 
they read. Tim Etchells sheds light on this seeming contradiction in his recent reflections on 
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Speak Bitterness when he states the piece ‘is as much about the nature of confession and 
guilt, the limits and energies of empathy, complicity, forgiveness and judgement, as it is 
about any particular thing that is named’.21  
 
The plural pronoun ‘We’ with which the performers begin most statements is, for Etchells, ‘a 
shifting and problematic construct’.22  It could refer to the onstage collective or might more 
broadly encompass members of the audience, who are also cast in the role of playing 
themselves. Etchells states that: 
 
Most people would perhaps feel covered by or sign up to statements like ‘we 
had our doubts’ or ‘we lost our way’, but many would balk at signing up to 
statements such as ‘we were date rapists’ or ‘we pushed the dog shit through 
immigrants’ doors’. The we of the text, first appearing as a place of 
communal shelter and definition, rapidly becomes a problem.23  
 
The all-encompassing ‘we’ fragments as the performers construct a sense of face-to-face 
responsibility by delivering many of their lines carefully and deliberately to specific 
spectators, artfully fostering a sense in the spectator that they are being sought out for a 
specific exchange. The direct address of the performance material, together with the manner 
in which the performers deliver it, requires the spectators to be answerable and therefore 
implicated in the immediacy of the event. The spectators may identify with the confessional 
statements, aligning themselves as accomplices in the guilty act, or may distance themselves, 
acting as witnesses to the public admission of the speaker. The witness position invites the 
spectator to take a critical stance on the confession. The accomplice position can arise from 
either direct recognition of the particular confession or a more vicarious identification with it, 
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potentially inciting a complex emotional response in which an obvious public shame clashes 
with the spectator’s private jouissance.   
 
The private indulgence in transgressive behaviour is, for Žižek, accompanied by a particular 
form of enjoyment that is grounded in the risky flouting of legal or moral norms, the breaking 
of the Law. This enjoyment, which he calls ‘obligatory jouissance’,24 is produced by the 
possibility of standing outside of the symbolic mandate, cheating the role that is assigned to 
you within the social order. Such a transgression is no longer tolerable once it has come to the 
attention of the big Other. The public speaking of confessions in Speak Bitterness calls each 
transgression to the attention of the big Other in this way, and the spectators are invited to 
justify themselves before the big Other as accomplices, or occupy the place of the big Other 
as witnesses.  
 
What is significant in Žižek’s theory of enjoyment for understanding the political strategy 
implicit in Speak Bitterness, however, is that far from releasing the subject from his/her 
symbolic mandate, and thus introducing the possibility of adopting a radical position outside 
of the Law, transgression and its attendant experience of enjoyment embroils the subject 
further inside normative structures. As Žižek states: 
 
enjoyment itself, which we experience as “transgression”, is in its innermost 
status something imposed, ordered - when we enjoy, we never do it 
“spontaneously”, we always follow a certain injunction. The psychoanalytic 
name for this obscene injunction, for this obscene call, “Enjoy!” is 
superego.25 
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The Law, internally monitored by the superego, is thus understood by Žižek to be 
underpinned by a shady, obscene possibility of its own violation - a possibility which the Law 
silently sanctions and sustains in order to ensure its own continuation. In this sense any 
enjoyment experienced through identifying with the transgression, either directly or 
vicariously, of various confessions is, from a Žižekian viewpoint, as implicit an element of 
legal and moral conformity as taking the judgemental position of the big Other.  
 
The performer /spectator relationships of Speak Bitterness draw the audience repeatedly into 
such acts of conformity in an operation which can be understood with reference to Žižek’s 
critique of Althusser’s ideological procedure of interpellation. The oft quoted passage from 
Althusser which describes this procedure offers an example of ‘hailing’, where the one who 
responds to the policeman’s call ‘Hey, you there’ immediately identifies herself as a subject 
of ideological power.  For Žižek, however, the ‘subject’ is not produced, as Althusser argues, 
at the moment they respond to being hailed; rather ‘there is already an uncanny subject that 
precedes the gesture of subjectivization.’26 The policeman’s cry may provoke a direct 
response from one respondent, but it also inspires a reaction in all who hear it. Žižek argues 
that even those who hear the policeman’s hailing but protest their innocence nevertheless 
experience  
 
an indeterminate Kafka-esque feeling of ‘abstract’ guilt, a feeling that, in the 
eyes of power, I am a priori terribly guilty of something, although it is not 
possible for me to know what precisely I am guilty of, and for that reason - 
since I don’t know what I am guilty of - I am even more guilty; or, more 
pointedly, it is in this very ignorance of mine that my true guilt consists.27 
 
 - 15 - 
Each confession in the performance of Speak Bitterness can be understood as a performance 
of interpellation; each iteration of the pronoun ‘we’ acts as a means of hailing those who will 
identify with its terms. Yet before the spectator responds to the content of what is said, 
adopting either an accomplice or witness position, the confessional form already arouses this 
potential ‘indeterminate guilt’ in each spectator. For Žižek such indeterminate guilt testifies 
to a split within the subject between their necessary adherence to the symbolic mandate and a 
void within the subject which is always already outside of it.  
 
The relentless and infinite claims in the performance text to specific acts of transgression 
suggest the frustrating inescapability of ideologically determinate guilt. Although the all-
encompassing ‘we’ repeatedly arouses the possibility of a primordial subject that is not 
complicit with ideology (through either transgression or judgement), the spectator and 
performer are always enfolded back into conformity by the determinate statement. 
Simultaneously, our capacity for enjoyment, judgement and specific response is likely to 
erode with the passing hours of the durational exhaustion of the performance text. Through 
this disjuncture, what is fundamentally being critiqued here is the very injunction to ‘enjoy!’, 
which structures the ideological principle of Western states at the level of the subject. What is 
at stake in this critique is not the revelation of the ideological object but the ongoing 
complicity with the current state of affairs through the illusion that individual acts of 
transgression are a meaningful challenge to ideological sanctions. For the neoliberal subject, 
even the individual freedom to transgress is here exposed as an act of ideological complicity. 
 
By confronting the spectator with his/her own enjoyment as a subjective aspect of ideological 
conformity, a gap potentially opens up which threatens to rupture or fissure our complicity 
with the Neoliberal status quo. Nevertheless, while we may perpetually revisit the uncanny 
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subject that precedes interpellation, its position outside of the symbolic mandate of the Law 
ultimately remains inaccessible. In this sense, the dramaturgical strategy at work in Speak 
Bitterness is comparable to that in operation in Void Story – which confronts the spectator 
with his/her own desire as a subjective aspect that motivates ideology from within. In 
Exquisite Pain, Forced Entertainment move beyond such inescapability by turning to another 
form of jouissance in order to glimpse the possibilities of resistance beyond ideology as it is 
structured into theatricality, language and identification. 
 
Exquisite Pain 
Exquisite Pain differs from Void Story and Speak Bitterness in two significant respects: first, 
and uniquely, it is not original material devised and shaped by Etchells and the company, but 
a staging of a book of the same name by Sophie Calle;28 and second, following the form of 
the book, it revolves around the repetition of an autobiographical story told by Calle of the 
events leading up to and including a break-up with her lover. The book and the staging also 
include other stories of personal suffering which were collected by Calle immediately after 
her break-up.  
 
Forced Entertainment’s staging of Exquisite Pain involves two performers (in the version I 
saw, these were Cathy Naden and Jerry Killick); each sat behind tables on either side of the 
stage. The storytelling moves alternately between Naden reading Calle’s autobiographical 
text and Killick reading the additional stories collected by Calle. Before this alternate reading 
begins, however, Naden reads out the following statement: 
 
Sophie left for Japan on October 25th 1984 unsuspecting that this trip would 
bring her to the unhappiest day of her life. She got back to France on January 
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28th 1985. From that moment whenever people asked her how it went she 
told them about her suffering. In return she started asking both friends and 
chance encounters: when did you suffer the most? She decided to continue 
such exchanges until she got over her own pain either by comparing it to 
other people’s, or until she had worn out her own story by sheer repetition.29 
 
Each of Naden’s texts recount the same events of Calle’s break-up with her lover (referred to 
throughout as M), a friend of her father’s to whom she had been attracted for several years. 
The break-up occurs when M fails to attend a reunion with Calle in Delhi after a short period 
of enforced separation. On each telling, the basic elements of the narrative remain the same 
but are embellished with different, and sometimes contradictory, details. The stories collected 
by Calle and read by Killick cover a wide range of experiences, from the death of loved ones 
to other instances of break-up and betrayal. Irrespective of how traumatic these stories are, 
however, Calle repeats her own in response and thus never seems to wear out her own 
suffering, as she had hoped, by simply ‘comparing it to other people’s’. In fact, the failure of 
the collected stories to exhaust her suffering renders each one as the motivation for a further 
iteration of Calle’s own story. 
 
The form of the performance and its representation in Calle’s book is not emotionally 
indulgent, however, and precludes the elicitation of empathy for the stories. Consistent with 
the original form of Calle’s artwork, in Forced Entertainment’s staging of Exquisite Pain, the 
performers retain a neutral detachment from the texts they read. Correspondingly, this 
dramaturgy encourages a theatrical, objective distance between the spectators and the 
performance material. This distance allows Calle’s reiterations of her story to be read as a 
fetish. For Žižek ‘what fetishism gives body to is precisely my disavowal of knowledge, my 
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refusal to subjectively assume what I know’.30 In this sense, Calle’s persistent reiteration of 
the story, the telling of pain, is therefore something she is clinging on to as a means of 
avoiding the traumatic impact of the actual events themselves. 
 
Forced Entertainment’s performance of Exquisite Pain might be read differently, however. 
Whilst the reader might leave and return to Calle’s book, and thus potentially engage in a 
contemplative experience of the material, in the performance the spectator is required to 
endure the multiple tellings and re-tellings of the same events in one long sitting. Although 
the performance lasts for under two hours, without an interval or any variation in the 
alternating dynamic between the two readers, the seemingly endless circularity of the texts, 
always returning to a variation of Calle’s autobiographical event, can create an experience of 
frustration. This backwards and forwards motion arouses a sense of shared jouissance, as an 
‘exquisite pain’ aroused by the verbal repetition of the story.  
 
This particular jouissance crucially differs from the ‘obligatory jouissance’ aroused through 
the dramaturgical structures of Speak Bitterness. There is no sense of social laws or taboos 
being crossed or, crucially, any modelling of a shameful enjoyment by the performers. In its 
numerous elaborations of the main events, inconsistently combining and recombining details, 
Calle’s text (and Naden’s reading of it) might be understood rather as an example of what 
Žižek terms ‘jouissance of the Other’.31 Not compelled by the superego injunction to 
‘Enjoy!’, jouissance of the Other is ‘closely linked to the domain of the Other’s discourse’ 
and produces a ‘satisfaction provided by speech itself’.32 Rather than a sign of fetishistic 
behaviour, then, Calle’s ceaseless reporting of the event can be understood as an 
inexhaustible form of such jouissance. 
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The persistent retelling is motivated by an unrelenting and determined effort to articulate her 
desire which is inevitably thwarted by ‘[t]he self-reflexivity of language’; as Žižek argues, it 
‘bears witness to the impossibility inscribed into the very heart of language: its failure to 
grasp the Real.’33 This impossibility produces a gap between the enunciated and the 
enunciation, the gap which is maintained between the speaker’s intention and what can be 
signified through language. Far from wearing out Calle’s pain, the doomed repetition 
maintains the Real of her suffering, which in turn ultimately eludes the attempt to contain it 
in language.34 The inconsistent details of the multiple reiterations are an irrelevance 
compared to the inaccessible Real of the scenario that is Calle’s true target. Žižek argues that 
 
[e]ven if the object of desire is an illusory lure, there is a Real in this illusion: 
the object of desire in its positive nature is vain, but not the place it occupies, 
the place of the Real, which is why there is more truth in unconditional 
fidelity to one’s desire than in resigned insight into the vanity of one’s 
striving. 35  
 
In the enduring intensity of the performance, Naden’s frustrating reiterations of Calle’s story 
are less an evasive fetish than a determined refusal to leave or substitute the place of the 
Real. Calle’s project in this form demonstrates the unconditional fidelity to one’s desire by 
refusing to allow the I of the enunciation to become the I of the enunciated subject whose 
desire is subsumed into the social fantasy sustaining the subject’s relation to the status quo. 
 
Unlike the indeterminate guilt aroused in Speak Bitterness, therefore, the dramaturgical 
structure of Exquisite Pain performs an obstinate dimension of subjectivity that inures itself 
against the inevitable fate of interpellation. Unlike the linear narrative of Void Story, the 
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enduring cycle observes an unconditional fidelity to one’s desire without accommodating the 
subjective desires of the spectator. As such, the text is not in thrall to some big Other but 
rather evidences a clear separation from it. By refusing to exhaust the search for the Real of 
Calle’s desire, and much to the potential frustration and alienation of the spectator, Exquisite 
Pain maintains a separation between the I of the enunciation and the I of the enunciated, and 
also blockades the possibility of an ideological, intersubjective exchange between performer 
and spectator. In doing so, the event is endured as a stalemate through the speaker’s refusal to 
validate the fantasy which symbolically structures and supports reality. 
 
Taken together, the three performances of Void Story, Speak Bitterness and Exquisite Pain 
approach the ideological problem of the neoliberal subject from varying and complementary 
perspectives. The narrative form of Void Story and the endless listing of confessions in Speak 
Bitterness recognise that a critical perspective is as embroiled in ideological adherence as is 
unwitting complicity. The explorations of desire, guilt and enjoyment in these performances 
may allow the spectator a minimal distance from the ideological fantasy, but they also 
frustrate the possibility of traversing it. The performers, always aware of the spectator’s 
constitutive role in the theatrical event, bring the latter’s interpassive complicity into play, 
and into view. The ensuing critique of the neoliberal subject, a critique which is performed 
through experience rather than through revelation, ultimately denies the subject access to a 
more radical, non-complicit position. In its uncompromising commitment to the retelling of 
Sophie Calle’s story, Exquisite Pain on the other hand gives no ground to either the 
ideological fantasy or the spectator’s desire. In doing so, the experiential critique implicit in 
the piece opens up the impasse of non-complicity through a performance of the subject’s 
unconditional fidelity to his/her own desire. 
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Conclusion 
 
In pointing out that ‘there are more of you than there are of us’, Robin Arthur is not simply 
drawing attention to the outnumbering of the performers by the audience as a meta-theatrical 
reality of the performance event, he is also acknowledging the audience’s complicity and 
active responsibility in its progress. Forced Entertainment enfolds the audience into a mode 
of interpassivity, through which the stage knowingly evokes, panders to and feeds off the 
spectators’ own engagement, reflecting the ideological scenario in which consciousness is 
normally separated from action: as Žižek notes, contemporary ideology understands that its 
subjects ‘know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not 
know’.36 
 
The dramaturgy of Forced Entertainment thus implicates spectators in the performance action 
in ways which trouble their disavowal of complicity. Void Story, unusually for a Forced 
Entertainment production, follows a linear narrative of cause and effect which follows the 
protagonists’ futile attempts to escape their fate. In separating the component elements of the 
performance – image, sound, language, space, performer and spectator –, the production 
isolates the desire of the spectator as the ultimate motivator of the stage action. In Speak 
Bitterness, by contrast, both spectator and performer are ensnared in a cycle of guilt, 
enjoyment and judgement that perpetually returns them to ideological complicity. Although 
both productions presume that a place of resistance exists and also allow for the possibility 
that such a place may be glimpsed in performance, the event itself does not claim to know 
such a place or a secure and privileged route that would lead to it.  
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Exquisite Pain operates by a different dramaturgical structure and presupposes another 
relationship with its spectators. It may well be seen as the inversion of Void Story, as the 
desire of the protagonist remains unbending even when outnumbered by the spectators. The 
resilient obstinacy of the speaker here contrasts with the performers and spectators of Speak 
Bitterness, whose perennial guilt always, in Žižekian terms, compromises the fidelity to their 
desire. Both Speak Bitterness and Void Story ensnare the audience through a pursuit of the 
objects of guilt and desire, respectively, as either the specific content of the confession or the 
unfolding narrative circumstances of Kim and Jackson. Exquisite Pain, alternatively, returns 
insistently and with fidelity to the place of desire, rather than attaching desire to any specific 
object. In doing so, it avoids both the enjoyment and the indeterminate guilt that enfolds us in 
the ideological trap of Speak Bitterness and it also allows access to an aspect of ourselves that 
precedes and eludes normal interpellation.  
 
For the neoliberal subject, then, the machinations of ideology can no longer be uncovered in 
the elsewhere of socio-economic structures; rather, they must be negotiated, succumbed to or 
resisted as the subjective aspect of each moment in which the desire, guilt or enjoyment of 
our experience is aroused. The performance work of Forced Entertainment, in its arresting 
encounters with the audience, critiques ideology through a committed yet exposing 
confrontation in which the performer-spectator relationship is constitutive of the event in both 
its ideological and theatrical dimensions.  
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